The scam industry in East Asia: $114 billion in damages and the cryptocurrency infrastructure of crime
The scale of organized fraud in East and Southeast Asia, as well as in Australia and New Zealand, has reached astronomical levels. Based on my estimates derived from analysis of data from relevant agencies, the total damage from scam operations in 2025 amounted to between $88.3 billion and $114.1 billion. These are not just numbers — they are a marker of a qualitative shift in the region's criminal economy.
For context: in 2023, similar losses were estimated in the range of $18–37 billion. That is, over two years, the volume of theft has roughly tripled. At the same time, the calculation methodology accounts for both officially registered cases and latent crime — victims who, for various reasons, do not contact law enforcement agencies.
The leaders in documented losses for 2024–2025 were China ($5.1 billion), the Republic of Korea ($3.5 billion), and Taiwan ($2.8 billion). However, the actual figures may be significantly higher due to differences in national classifications of fraudulent schemes.
Transformation of the Criminal Economy: From Syndicates to Franchising
We are witnessing not just an increase in the number of scam centers, but a fundamental restructuring of the entire regional criminal ecosystem. Previously fragmented groups are consolidating into cross-border networks with a unified infrastructure. This model, which some experts compare to corporate franchising, includes specialized "departments" for money laundering, human trafficking, illegal migrant smuggling, and data collection.
A key element of this system is isolated scam compounds, where people are detained and forced to work in online fraudulent schemes, from investment scams to romance traps. The scale and complexity of this criminal economy already outpace existing countermeasures.
Cryptocurrencies as the Settlement Infrastructure of Crime
The role of digital assets deserves special attention. Criminal groups systematically use cryptocurrencies, encrypted communications, artificial intelligence, and satellite communications. However, the main tool is the USDT stablecoin on the TRON network. This combination has effectively created a parallel financial system for instant, cheap, and pseudonymous cross-border transfers.
Through P2P platforms, over-the-counter brokers, and underground banking networks, fraudsters convert fiat into stablecoins and back, bypassing banking controls. Simply interrupting transactions without seizing crypto assets is ineffective — the revenues of criminal networks remain out of reach.
AI and Starlink: New Tools for Old Schemes
Generative artificial intelligence lowers the barrier to entry for complex fraudulent schemes. Even small groups can now use AI translation, character generation, phishing texts, voice cloning, and real-time deepfake videos. Additionally, a 42% year-over-year increase in the use of legitimate advertising networks to distribute malware has been recorded.
Satellite internet, including Starlink, allows attackers to be less dependent on local telecom operators and operate in hard-to-reach areas. This is legitimate infrastructure that is nevertheless actively used for criminal purposes.
Global Recruitment and Network Resilience
The geography of recruitment extends beyond Asia. People from at least 80 countries have been identified in scam compounds. Advertisements presumably linked to scam centers require knowledge of German, Polish, Spanish, French, and other European languages. This indicates an expansion in the geography of the search for both employees and victims.
It is important to understand: forceful pressure on individual sites does not destroy the infrastructure. Networks simply change jurisdictions, fragment operations, and recover through new nodes. This is akin to fighting a hydra — cutting off one head does not solve the problem.
My conclusion: We are facing a global criminal industry that uses the most advanced technologies and financial instruments. Combating it requires not just strengthening law enforcement measures, but also revising approaches to cryptocurrency regulation, international cooperation, and control over financial flows. Without this, the damage will only grow.